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Abstract
The question of whether AI can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not
one amenable either to discovery or mere reasoning, because we as societies are constantly
constructing our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Here I briefly examine the origins
and nature of ethical systems in a variety of species, then propose a definition of morality that
facilitates the debate concerning not only whether it is ethical for us to afford moral agency
and patiency to AI, but also whether it is ethical for us to build AI we should so afford.
1 Introduction
The question of Robot Ethics is difficult to resolve not because of the nature of Robots but because
of the nature of Ethics. As with all normative ethics, this requires that we decide what “really”
matters—what are our ethical priorities? Are we more obliged to our biological kin or to those
who share our ideas? Do we value the preservation of culture more or the generation of new ideas?
Asking “what really matters” is like asking “what happened before time”: it sounds at first pass
like a good question, but in fact makes a logical error. Before is not defined outside of the context
of time. Similarly, we cannot circuitously assume that a system of values underlies our system of
values. Consequently, the “correct” place for robots in human society cannot be resolved from first
principles or purely by reason.
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The primary argument of this article is that integrating a new problem like artificial intelligence
(AI) into our moral systems is an act normative, not descriptive, ethics. Descriptive ethics may take
us some way in establishing precedent, though few consider precedent sufficient or even necessary
for establishing what is right. But the advent of potentially-autonomous decision-making human
artefacts is novel. Deciding ethical priorities requires establishing the basis of our systems of values.
The nature of machines as artefacts means that the question of their morality is not what moral
status they deserve. Rather, we must ask both what moral status we are obliged to assign them,
and — at the same time — ask what moral status we are obliged to build them to be competent
to meet. This latter aspect of our concurrent, tightly-coupled responsibilities has been neglected
even by those scholars who have observed the constructive nature of the first (Coeckelbergh, 2010;
Gunkel, 2012b). Note here that obliged does require able —computationally and indeed logically
intractable systems such as Asimov’s laws cannot be part of the equation.
What makes reasoning about intelligent artefacts different from reasoning about natural entities
is that our obligations can be met not only through constructing the socio-ethical system but also
through specifying characteristics of the artefacts themselves. This is the definition of an artefact,
it is something we create, and it applies to both ethical systems and artificially intelligent ones. I
therefore begin my argument not from what should matter to us but rather from why things do.
Before considering where we might want to slot robots into our contemporary ethical frameworks
and society, I start by considering ethics and moral patiency from an evolutionary perspective, not
to inform our intuitions but to explain them.
To be very clear though from the outset, the moral question I address here is not whether it
is possible for robots or other AI artefacts to be moral patients. Human culture can and does
support a wide variety of moral systems. Obviously it is easy to describe one such that even certain
unintelligent artefacts are owed patiency, and indeed many if not most moral systems hold this for
some objects (e.g. particular books or flags). The far more interesting and important question is
whether we as academics should recommend putting intelligent artefacts in that position. I will
argue that making robots such that they deserve to be moral patients could in itself be construed
as an immoral action, particularly given that it is avoidable. In doing so I consider not only human
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society, but also make potential robots into second-order moral patients. I claim that it would be
unethical to put them in a situation of competition with us, to make them suffer, or to make them
unnecessarily mortal. I do not claim that it is wrong to use machine intelligence to create —- that
is, to produce human culture. But I do claim that is incoherent to think that human pleasure
can be extended by proxy. Therefore there are costs but no benefits from the perspective of either
humans or robots to ascribing and implementing either agency or patiency to intelligent artefacts
beyond that ordinarily ascribed to any possession.
2 The Nature of Life and Intelligence
I start from the entirely functionalist perspective that our system of ethics has coevolved with
our species and our societies. As with all human (and other ape, Whiten and van Schaik, 2007)
behaviour, it is rooted both in our biology and our culture. Nature is a scruffy designer with no
motivation or capacity to cleanly discriminate between these two strategies, except that that which
must change more quickly should be represented more plasticly (Hinton and Nowlan, 1987; Depew,
2003). As human cultural evolution has accelerated, increasingly our ethical norms are represented
in highly plastic forms such as legislation and policy (Ostas, 2001).
The problem with a system of representing behaviour being so plastic as explicit decision making
is that this plasticity can lead to dithering. Dithering is a technical term for switching from one goal
to the other so rapidly that little or no progress is made on either (Humphrys, 1996; Rohlfshagen
and Bryson, 2010). Dithering is a problem potentially faced by any autonomous actor with multiple
goals that at least partially conflict and must be maintained concurrently. Here ‘partial conflict’
can be resource-based, for example needing to visually attend to the actions of two children at one
time, or needing to both sleep and work. An example of dithering in early computers was called
thrashing—a result of running two interacting programs which were each nearly as large as primary
memory. The operating system would allocate each program a period of processing time, which
would necessarily start with an attempt to read that program in to memory from disk, a process
called paging or swapping. If swapping each program in took longer than the time slice allocated to
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that program, then both programs would do nothing except alternately attempt to page themselves
into memory. The computer would appear to ‘freeze’ since there would be no actual progress made
by either program.
More generally, dithering is changing goals so quickly that more time is wasted in the transition
than is gained in accomplishment. Thus even when we make decisions about regulating behaviour
in the extremely dynamic present, we try to plant them in “permanent” bedrock, like tall buildings
built on a swamp. For example, American law is often debated in the context of the US constitution,
despite being rooted in British Common Law and therefore a constantly changing set of precedents.
Ethics is often debated in the context of ancient holy texts, even when the ethical questions at
hand concern contemporary matters such as abortion or robots about which there is no reference
or consideration in the original documents.
Perhaps it is to avoid dithering that our society believes that basic principles of our ethics are
rational and fixed, and that the apparent changes such as universal suffrage or the end of legalised
human slavery are simply “corrections” to make the system more rational. But a better model is to
consider our ethical structures and morality to co-evolve with our society. When the value of human
life relative to other resources was lower, murder was more frequent and political empowerment less
widely distributed (Johnson and Monkkonen, 1996; Pinker, 2011). What it means to be human has
changed, and our ethical system has changed along with this.
3 The Origins of Social and Ethical Behaviour
Assessing morality is not trivial, even for apparently trivial, ‘robotic’ behaviour. MacLean et al.
(2010) demonstrate the overall social utility of organisms behaving in what at first assessment seems
to be an anti-social way — free riding off of pro-social agents that manufacture costly public goods.
Single-cell organisms produce a wise array of public goods ranging from shelter to instructions for
combatting antibiotics (Rankin et al., 2010). In this particular case we are discussing the production
of digestive enzymes by the more ‘altruistic’ of two isogenic yeast strains. The yeast must excrete
these enzymes outside of their bodies, because (of course) they do not have stomachs. They can only
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directly absorb pre-digested food. The production of these enzymes is costly, requiring difficult-to-
construct proteins, and the production of pre-digested food is beneficial not only to the excreting
yeast but also to any other yeast in its vicinity. The production of these enzymes thus meets a
common anthropological and economic definition of altruism, paying a cost to express behaviour
that benefits others (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Sylwester et al., 2013).
In the case of single-cell organisms there is no ‘choice’ as to whether to be free-riding or pro-
social —this is genetically determined by their strain, but the two sorts of behaviour are accessible
from each other via common processes of mutation (Wagner and Altenberg, 1996; Kirschner and
Gerhart, 1998; Kitano, 2004; Zhong and Priest, 2011). For these systems, natural selection performs
the ‘action selection’ by determining what proportion of which strategy lives and dies. What
MacLean et al. (2010) have shown is that selection operates such that the species as a whole benefits
optimally. The ‘altruistic’ strain in fact overproduces the public good (the digestive enzymes) at a
level that would be wasteful, while the ‘free-riding’ strain of course underproduces. Where there
are insufficient altruists free-riders starve, allowing altruists to invade. Where there are too few
free-riders excess food aggregates, allowing free-riders to invade. Thus the greatest good—the most
efficient exploitation of the available resources—is achieved by the species as a whole through a
mixture of over-enthusiastic altruism and free riding. Why doesn’t evolution just optimise the
species to produce the optimal level of public goods? This is again due to plasticity. The optimal
amount of enzyme production is determined by the ecological substrate the yeast inhabits, and
this can change more quickly than the physical mechanism for enzyme production in one strain
can evolve. However death and birth can be exceedingly rapid in single-cell organisms. A mixed
population composed of multiple strategies, where the high and low producers will always over and
under produce respectively, and their proportions can be changed very rapidly, is thus the best
strategy for tracking the rate of environmental change — for rapidly responding to variation in
opportunity.
What do these results imply for human society? Perhaps our culture adds benefit to over-
production of public goods by calling the action of creating them ‘good’ and associating it with
social status, while our culture has evolved in a context of being able to rely on self interest to
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motivate the maintenance the countervailing population of defectors. Perhaps the ‘correct’ amount
of investment varies by socio-political context, for example increasing massively in times of warfare
but returning to more locally-productive levels at times of peace. Could the reduction of other’s
‘good’ behaviour itself be an act of public good in times when society requires more individual
productivity or self-sufficiency (cf. Trivers, 1971; Rosas, 2012)? This is a thread of a current
research programme in my group, looking to explain variations by global region in public-goods
regulation as demonstrated by Herrmann et al. (2008); Bryson et al. (2013). We have preliminary
evidence that human societies can also be described via varying proportions of individuals applying
particular social strategies, and that these proportions vary with the underlying socio-economic
substrate.
Of course, is does not imply ought. The roots of our ethics does not entirely determine where
it should or will progress. But the roots do determine our intuitions, which have been proposed
as a mechanism for determining our obligations with respect to AI (Dennett, 1987; Brooks, 2002).
Because of their origins in our evolutionary past, I do not trust the capacity of our intuitions to
inform our decision making. I do trust those with vested interests in particular outcomes (e.g.
selling weapons, robots or even books) to exploit our gut-level intuitions. In the following section I
turn instead to philosophy, to look at how we commonly define moral agency and patiency. In the
following sections I exploit these definitions to determine the roles we should expect AI to play in
our society.
4 Freedom and Morality
To quote Johnson (2006), “[Moral] action is an exercise of freedom and freedom is what makes
morality possible.” For millennia morality has been recognised as something uniquely human, and
therefore taken as an indication of human uniqueness and even divinity (Forest, 2009). But if
we throw away a supernaturalist and dualistic understanding of human mind and origins, we can
still maintain that human morality at least is rooted in the one incontrovertible aspect of human
uniqueness — language — and our unsurpassed competence for cultural accumulation that language
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both exemplifies and enables1. The cultural accumulation of new concepts gives us more ideas and
choices to reason over, and our accumulation of tools gives us more power to derive substantial
changes to our environment from our intentions.
If human morality depended simply on human language then our increasingly language-capable
machines would certainly be excellent candidates for agency and patiency. But I believe that
freedom — which I take here to mean the socially-recognised capacity to exercise choice is the
essential property of a moral actor (cf. Tonkens, 2009; Rosas, 2012). Dennett (2003) argues that
human freedom is a consequence of evolving complexity beyond our own capacity to provide a better
account for our behaviour than to attribute it to our own individual responsibility. This argument
entails a wide variety of interesting consequences. For example, as our science of psychology develops
and more behaviour becomes explicable via other means (e.g. insanity) fewer actions become moral.
I believe we can usefully follow from Dennett’s suggestion to generalise morality beyond human
ethical systems. Moral actions for an individual are those for which:
1. a particular behavioural context affords more than one possible action for the individual,
2. at least one available action is considered by a society to be more socially beneficial than the
other options, and
3. the individual is able to recognise which action is socially beneficial (or at least socially
sanctioned) and act on this information.
Note that this captures society-specific morals as well as the individual’s role as the actor. With this
definition I deliberately extend morality to include actions by other species which may be sanctioned
by their society, or by ours. For example, non-human primates will sanction those that violate their
social norms by being excessively brutal in punishing a subordinate (de Waal, 2007), for failing to
‘report’ vocally available food (Hauser, 1992) or for sneaking copulation (Byrne and Whiten, 1988).
While reports of social sanctions of such behaviour are often referred to as ‘anecdotal’ because
1Bryson (2008, 2009b) argues that language while unique is not inexplicably improbable but rather a result of
the conjunction of two less-unusual adaptive traits: a heavy reliance on ‘culture’ — socially acquired behaviour —
common in many large, long-lived species of animals, particularly apes, and the capacity for vocal imitation which
has emerged independently in many phyla, but nowhere else among the simians.
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they are not yet well documented in primate literature, they are common knowledge for anyone
who has been lucky enough to work with socially housed primates. I personally have violated a
Capuchin monkey norm: possession is ownership. I was sanctioned (barked at) by the entire colony
— not only those who observed the affront2, but also those housed separately who had no visual
knowledge of the event but joined the chorus of reproach. Similarly, this definition allows us to say
dogs and even cats can be good or bad when they obey or disobey human social norms they have
been trained to recognise, provided they have demonstrated a capacity to select between relevant
alternative behaviours, and when they behave as if they expect social sanction when they select the
proscribed option.
Returning then to AI, there is then I think no question that we can already train or simply
program machines to recognise more or less socially acceptable actions, and to use that information
to inform action selection. The question is whether it is moral for us to construct machines that of
their own volition choose the less-moral action. The trick here returns to the definition of freedom
I took from Dennett. For it to be rational for us to describe an action by a machine to be “of its
own volition”, we must sufficiently obfuscate its decision-making process that we cannot otherwise
predict its behaviour, and thus are reduced to applying sanctions to it in order for it to learn to
behave in a way that our society prefers3.
What is fundamentally different from nature here is that since we have perfect control over when
and how a robot is created, responsibility is traded off. Consider responsibility for actions executed
by the artefact that lie within our own understanding, and thus for which we would ordinarily be
responsible. If we choose to assign this responsibility to the artefact we are deliberately disavowing
the responsibility ourselves. Currently, even where we have imperfect control as in the case of
young children, owned animals and operated machines, if we lose control over entities we have
responsibility for and cannot themselves be held accountable, then we hold the responsibility for
2I had taken back the bit of a sweater a monkey had snatched but which was still being worn by a guest. I had
been warned when first employed never to take anything from a monkey but to ask them to release it, but failed to
generalise this to the context where most of the object was still attached to the original owner.
3Note that I do not consider training action selection via reinforcement learning or neural networks to be ob-
fuscated in this sense, simply because we don’t know the exact ‘meaning’ of individual components of the internal
representation. The basic principles of optimisation that underly machine learning are well-understood (Wolpert,
1996), and sufficient for moral clarity.
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that loss of control and whatever actions by these other entities comes as a consequence. If our dog
or our car kills a child, we are not held accountable for murder, but we may be held accountable
for manslaughter. Why — or in what circumstances — should this be different for a robot?
5 Principles of Robotics
Our consideration of how we should adjust our ethical systems to encapsulate the AI we create
requires reasoning about multiple levels of ethical obligation and ethical strategies. In the yeast
example I gave earlier, ‘anti-social’ behaviour actually regulated the overall investment of a society
— a spatially-local subset of a species inhabiting a particular ecological substrate — in a beneficial
way. Behaviour that was disadvantageous very local to the free-riders was less-locally advantageous
to the species. The definition of morality introduced in Section 4 depends on social benefit. Con-
sidering robot agency and patiency then, requires considering benefits and costs for at least two
potential societies: our own and the robots’. For each of these, consider who benefits and who does
not from the designation of moral agency and patiency on AI:
• The perspective of human well being. The advantages to humans seem to be primarily that
it feeds our ego to construct objects that we owe moral status. It is possible that in the long
term it would also be a simpler way to control truly complex intelligence, and that the benefits
of that complex intelligence might outweigh the costs of losing our own moral responsibility
and therefore moral status. The principle cost I see is the facilitation of the unnecessary
abrogation of responsibility of marketers or operators of AI. For example, customers could be
fooled into wasting resources needed by their children or parents on a robot, or citizens could
be fooled into blaming a robot rather than a politician for unnecessary fatalities in warfare
(Sharkey and Sharkey, 2010; Bryson and Kime, 2011; Bryson, 2000, 2010).
• The perspective of AI well being. Although this argument has been overlooked by some critics
(notably Gunkel, 2012a), Bryson (2010, 2009a) makes AI into second-order moral patients
by arguing that we should not put AI in the position of competing with us for resources,
of longing for higher social status (as all evolved social vertebrates do), of fearing injury,
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extinction or humiliation. In short, we can afford to stay agnostic about whether AI have
qualia, because we can simply avoid constructing motivation systems encompassing suffering.
We know we can do this because we already have. There are many proactive AI systems now,
and none of them suffers. Just as there are already machines that play chess or do arithmetic
better than we do, but none of them aspires to world domination. There can be no costs to
the AI in the system I describe, unless we postulate rights of the ‘unborn’, or in this case the
never-designed.
Note that Tonkens (2009) makes a very similar point to mine concerning AI well being, which
Rosas (2012) disputes. I believe the root of the conflict here is that Rosas believes morality must be
rooted in social dominance structures. The definition of morality I introduced earlier in the section
eliminates this confound. For evolved intelligence, dominance structure may be an inevitable part
of the selective process, and therefore the dysphoric aspect of subjugation may also be universal.
Certainly therefore human ethical systems as part of social regulation have much to say concerning
dominance, but that is just one of their roles. But as I have already argued, in designed artefacts we
can safely eliminate this dysphoric aspect, replacing it with homogeneity between robots, human
regulation of robot roles, and / or emotionally-neutral self assessment by the AI.
Bryson et al. (2002) argue that the right way to think about intelligent services (there in the
context of the Internet, but here I will generalise this) is as extensions of our own motivational
systems. We are currently the principle agents when it comes to our own technology, and I believe
it is our ethical obligation to design both our AI and our legal and moral systems to maintain that
situation. Legally and ethically, AI works best as a sort of mental prosthetic to our own needs and
desires.
The best argument I know against this human-ethics perspective is that maltreating something
that reminds us of a human might lead us to treat other humans or animals worse as well (Parthe-
more and Whitby, 2012). The UK’s official Principles of Robotics specifically address this problem
in its fourth principle (Boden et al., 2011; Bryson, 2012, cf. Appendix A). This principle does so
in two ways. First, robots should not have deceptive appearance—they should not fool people into
thinking they are similar to empathy-deserving moral patients. Second, their AI workings should be
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‘transparent’. That is, clear, generally-comprehensible descriptions of their goals and intelligence
should be available to any owner, operator or concerned user, presumably over the Internet4. This
principle was adopted despite considerable concern about the requirement for both therapeutic and
simple commercial / entertainment concerns for robots to be masquerade as moral patients and
companions (cf. Miller et al., 2012). Because of this consideration, the principle is deliberately set so
that transparency may be available for informed long-term decisions, but not constantly apparent.
The goal is that most healthy adult citizens should be able to make correctly-informed decisions
about emotional and financial investment.
One thread of theory for the construction of strong AI holds that it may be impossible to create
the sort of intelligence we want or need unless we completely follow the existing biologically-inspired
templates which therefore must include social striving, pain, etc. So far there is no proof of this
position. But if it is ever demonstrated, even then we would not be in the position where our hand
was forced — that we must permit patiency and agency. Rather, we will then, and only then, have
enough information to stop, take council, and produce a literature and eventually legislation and
social norms on what is the appropriate amount of agency to permit given the benefits it provides.
6 Conclusion
As Johnson (2006, p. 201) puts it “Computer systems and other artefacts have intentionality—the
intentionality put into them by the intentional acts of their designers.” It is unquestionably within
our society’s capacity to define robots and other AIs as moral agents and patients, in fact many
articles in this special issue are working on this project. It may be technically possible to create
AI that would meet contemporary requirements for agency or patiency. But even if it is possible,
neither of these two statements makes it either necessary or desirable that we should do so. Both
our ethical system and our artefacts are amenable to human design. The primary argument of
this article is that making AI moral agents or patients is an intentional and avoidable action. The
4Note though that the principles stop short of recommending ubiquitous open source software, both because this
is of course no substitute for transparent documentation, but also because of security / hacking concerns over robots
with access to private homes and conversations.
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secondary argument which is admittedly open to debate, is that avoidance would be the most ethical
choice.
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Appendix A: The EPSRC Principles of Robotics
The full version of the below lists can be found by a Web search for EPSRC Principles of Robotics,
and they have been EPSRC policy since April of 2011 (Boden et al., 2011). The first list is the
principles themselves, in italics, with annotations taken from Bryson (2012).
1. Robots are multi-use tools. Robots should not be designed solely or primarily to kill or harm
humans, except in the interests of national security. While acknowledging that anything
can be used as a weapon by a sufficiently creative individual, the authors were concerned
to ban the creation and use of autonomous robots as weapons. Although we pragmatically
acknowledged this is already happening in the context of the military, we do not want to see
robotics so used in other contexts.
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots should be designed & operated as far
as is practicable to comply with existing laws & fundamental rights & freedoms, including
privacy. We were very concerned that any discussion of “robot ethics” could lead individuals,
companies or governments to abrogate their own responsibility as the builders, purchasers and
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deployers of robots. We felt the consequences of this concern vastly outweigh any “advantage”
to the pleasure of creating something society deigns sentient and responsible.
3. Robots are products. They should be designed using processes which assure their safety and
security. This principle again reminds us that the onus is on us, as robot creators, not on the
robots themselves, to ensure that robots do no damage.
4. Robots are manufactured artefacts. They should not be designed in a deceptive way to exploit
vulnerable users; instead their machine nature should be transparent. This was the most
difficult principle to agree on the phrasing of. The intent is that everyone who owns a robot
should know that it is not “alive” or “suffering”, yet the deception of life and emotional
engagement is precisely the goal of many therapy or toy robots. We decided that so long
as the responsible individual making the purchase of a robot has even indirect (e.g. Internet
documentation) access to information about how its “mind” works, that would provide enough
of an informed population to keep people from being exploited.
5. The person with legal responsibility for a robot should be attributed. It should always be
possible to find out who owns a robot, just like it is always possible to find out who owns a
car. This again reminds us that whatever a robot does, some human or human institution
(e.g. a company) is liable for its actions.
Below are seven additional points that the authors of the principles direct to their colleagues (c.f.
the documents cited above.)
1. We believe robots have the potential to provide immense positive impact to society. We want
to encourage responsible robot research.
2. Bad practice hurts us all.
3. Addressing obvious public concerns will help us all make progress.
4. It is important to demonstrate that we, as roboticists, are committed to the best possible
standards of practice.
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5. To understand the context and consequences of our research we should work with experts from
other disciplines including: social sciences, law, philosophy and the arts.
6. We should consider the ethics of transparency: are there limits to what should be openly
available?
7. When we see erroneous accounts in the press, we commit to take the time to contact the
reporting journalists.
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